Posts by: Alfredo

Is Divine Simplicity Scriptural?

One common criticism of divine simplicity is that it is an unscriptural dogma, and that in accepting it one subordinates Scripture to philosophical speculation. If simplicity is true and entails that talk of God is analogical then it would seem to imply that some passages require an interpretation different from their most immediate, literal one.

There are three points worth making. The first is that all biblical talk of God is going to require some philosophical interpretation. In fact, much of the Bible more generally will. Scripture is only made consistent under a certain interpretation. Are we to accept that Moses literally saw God’s back side? Clearly not, since God is immaterial and has no back, literally speaking. And what view of predestination and God’s providence are we to accept? This may largely depend on what view of free will you accept. Now, are we here “subordinating Scripture” to the idea that God is immaterial or that humans have libertarian free will? Maybe, but if we are then I don’t see anything wrong with this. There is nothing wrong with making Scripture consistent with one’s philosophical views so long as it does not radically distort what Scripture is saying (for instance, by saying that the Resurrection is just a metaphor).

Second, not all philosophical or theological doctrines need to be grounded immediately in Scripture. Maybe simplicity isn’t explicitly stated in scripture. In fact, this is obvious. But this is an unfair requirement to impose on defenders of simplicity. After all, neither is it stated explicitly in Scripture that God is three hypostases in one ousia.

You may reply that the idea is found implicitly there, but then I would say that so is simplicity. And this brings me to my third point, that by any reasonable criterion of something’s being scriptural, simplicity is scriptural. Simplicity is implicit in Scripture in that it follows from a strong doctrine of aseity and God’s providence, which is found stated in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16. These passages say that all things were created by God. So it is true that whatever is non-identical to God is created by God. But if God had parts he would have to create his parts, and in so doing create himself, which can’t be true since God is uncreated and uncaused. Hence, God doesn’t have any parts and is simple.

One may reply that these passages should be taken loosely. But then I see no principled basis upon which to accuse defenders of simplicity of “subordinating scripture” while saying a “non-simple” view of God doesn’t. For now we are interpreting these passages in a less than strict sense in order to save the view that God is non-simple. And this seems to be precisely what simplicity was being accused of.

E.J. Lowe on the Unavoidability of Metaphysics

“Some people believe that the age of metaphysics is past and that what metaphysicians aspire to achieve is an impossible dream. They claim that it is an illusion to suppose that human beings can formulate and justify an undistorted picture of the fundamental structure of reality — either because reality is inaccessible to us or else because it is a myth to suppose that a reality independent of our beliefs exists at all. To these sceptics I reply that the pursuit of metaphysics is inescapable for any rational being and that they themselves demonstrate this in the objections which they raise against it. For to say that reality is inaccessible to us or that there is no reality independent of our beliefs is just to make a metaphysical claim.

And if they reply by admitting this while at the same time denying that they or any one else can justify metaphysical claims by reasoned argument, then my response is twofold. First, unless they can give me some reason for thinking that metaphysical claims are never justifiable, I do not see why I should accept what they say about this. Secondly, if they mean to abandon reasoned argument altogether, even in defence of their own position, then I have nothing to say to them because they have excluded themselves from further debate.”

Reply to William Lane Craig on Divine Simplicity

[Originally posted here.]

A week ago, Dr. William Lane Craig responded to my previous post on divine simplicity and analogy. Gil already brought up some important objections to Craig’s account here.

Now, Craig is actually correct about one thing: My argument does not by itself entail that God is identical to all his parts. This only follows from the conclusion of my argument if you grant that God really has a will, intellect, etc. Craig does not grant this, since he doesn’t think talk about things having parts is metaphysically substantive.

There are a lot of things to say about Craig’s response here. Maybe the first is to simply note that he is denying that anything really, in the metaphysically deepest sense, has any parts. This is surely an unacceptable conclusion. Personally I would think it’s better to simply deny God has any parts rather than to deny anything has parts. Absent this option, if I didn’t believe in divine simplicity I would even modify my account of divine sovereignty just to save parthood. For otherwise I honestly don’t know how Craig explains kidneys, brains, legs and their relations to the people who have them. This is just a datum of experience, that there are at least some parts.

Craig tries to use an argument by Peter van Inwagen to back up his thesis. However, the problem is that Van Inwagen’s argument only demonstrates the falsity of the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, which is the idea that any region of a body can be taken to be a proper part. His argument can only go through if we are dealing with ‘parts’ like Dottie* which are constituted by enough matter in such a form that a person can survive by becoming identical to them. It’s not obvious though that I could ever become identical to, say, my heart. So his argument would not go through with those sorts of proper parts.

Now, I’m inclined to reject the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts anyway so I’m happy to accept the soundness of the argument. But it just doesn’t demonstrate that there are no proper parts. And if it did entail that, then–like Peter Geach did with Tibbles the Cat–I would just take the argument to establish the relativity of identity rather than the complete lack of proper parthood. More importantly, it’s not even obviously sound. We might just deny the premise that Dottie becomes identical to Dottie*, since Dottie seems to be an animal (or a soul) and Dottie* seems to be a ‘lump’. In virtue of their falling under different sortals these two objects have different identity conditions associated with them, and thus by Leibniz’s law they are non-identical. They are merely constituted by the same matter.

There’s also something to be said about Craig’s underlying Carnapian sympathies. There is intense debate about taking this sort of view about language and metaphysical methodology (cf. the Chalmers volume on metametaphysics), and suffice it to say for now that I’m not too sympathetic. I will criticize this neo-Carnapian line of thought later, but this post should be enough to see why Craig’s response is inadequate.

Copyright and Illegal Downloading

Imagine having the ability to listen to, read, play, or watch whatever one wanted: movies, games, books, music, software; everything is for the taking. For most people this isn’t just a fantasy. It is a reality. File hosting, torrents, and other websites put all of the digital content in the world right at one’s fingertips. Despite its unlawfulness most people don’t think twice about whether or not they should download digital content. It’s simply not a big deal. However, I will argue in this paper that, to the contrary, the illegal downloading of such content is unethical and that the laws against it ought to be obeyed. I will first present four reasons why it should not be done. After this I will refute five common arguments used to justify illegal downloading. I will close with a final argument addressing the issue from a decidedly Christian perspective.

The Problem

It would help get to the heart of the question by first figuring out what the problem is not. The problem is not whether there is sufficient legal justification for the downloading of digital content; it is relatively clear that there is none, at least in the U.S. Rather, the question is whether there is sufficient moral justification for illegal downloading of digital content. Hence, when I use the term “illegal downloading”, I’m properly speaking of the type of downloading which is illegal in the United States and violates copyright. It’s important to note that this question can be assessed independently of whether or not illegal downloading is equivalent in nature to stealing. [1] The real issue is whether the two are morally equivalent, i.e. whether they are both equally wrong.

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A Traditionalist Critique of the Pro-Life Movement

I came across this link via a Facebook friend. I though it was interesting since it critiques the pro-life movement from a more traditionalist perspective rather than a liberal one. I think the author raises some interesting points, and I’m not saying I’m in favor of everything he’s against. Overall though his position seems to depend on fallacious slippery-slope arguments and simply false claims. In the following comments I’ll refer to “pro-lifer” as someone who agrees with the principles behind the pro-life movement which the author criticizes.

In one spot the author tries to show that there is not an obligation to step in on someone’s property in order to prevent the killing of a fetus, because this would lead to absurd consequences:

“Are we always obliged, either as Christians or as moral human beings, to trespass on someone’s property in order to prevent a sin or crime from taking place? What if the neighbor is only falsifying a tax return or reading pornography or committing adultery? Those actions may be sinful and criminal, we are told, but they do not involve loss of life. Then mere existence is the ultimate moral test? That is a strange line for Christians to take. Should the ancient martyrs have been rescued or Jesus dragged down from the cross?”

This is silly though. It doesn’t follow from the fact that I would stop my neighbor from murdering his child that I have to step in and stop him from falsifying his tax return. No pro-lifer would be stupid enough to say we are “always obliged…to trespass on someone’s property in order to prevent a sin or crime.” We would be obliged if someone was going to suck his child’s brains out though. Maybe other cases are less clear-cut, but this one isn’t.

Later in the article the author appears to be trying to show that the comparison of stopping an abortion to stopping a drowning is not helpful:

“But the specific example used by Operation Rescue is persuasive, and most Christians would agree that failure to save a drowning man’s life, where rescue could be achieved without danger, is close to murder. The problem with the example lies in the assumption that all these moral dilemmas involve abstract individuals.”

But that’s because we think that fetuses possess the same moral status as anyone else. So it is perfectly legitimate to refer to “abstract individuals.” He then goes on to not refute the argument by reference to talk about “moral ties” and “community.” But ultimately, I’d stop my neighbor who’s killing his child; moreover, I’d create a law which makes it illegal for people in my country to kill their children. The case of abortion is the same given the pro-lifer’s premise that fetuses are not morally inferior to human beings in later stages of development. So his points about moral ties ultimately turn out useless until he refutes this point.

The same holds with his description of a case from New York and the ensuing discussion: “If we apply the same sort of reasoning to the unborn, the principal effect will be to strengthen the government’s hand in its ongoing struggle to supplant the family. If there is an absolute and unquestionable right to life, then abortion will be only one of the options forbidden to pregnant women. What about smoking or drinking or, indeed, any activity that carried to an extreme could threaten the child’s life or reduce its birthweight?”

The author is here beginning to sound like a pro-choicer; only now it’s not the woman’s right to choose, but the family’s right to choose. (“The government will be restricting the family’s freedom!”) But this again rests on the crucial assumption that the fetus doesn’t have the same moral status as a child. In the case of an adolescent child nobody would say, “Well, we shouldn’t legally enforce an absolute right to life of adolescent children, since that might lead us to ban smoking or drinking from the household.” That would be silly. The same argument when applied to the fetus is silly as well. Clearly killing your children is murder and should be punished as such; the face that the child is in your womb makes no difference.

Aquinas on the State and the Common Good

“[E]ven though the good be the same objective for one man and for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to attain, that is, to procure and preserve the good of the whole state than the good of any one man. Certainly it is a part of that love which should exist among men that a man preserve the good even of a single human being. But it is much better and more divine that this be done for a whole people and for whole states. … This is said to be more divine because it shows greater likeness to God, who is the ultimate cause of all goodness.”

Davies on God’s Gracious Goodness

From pp. 231-232 of Fr. Brian Davies’ book, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil:

“A second point we might make is that we are saying quite a lot about God’s goodness when noting, as I have, that God creates nothing but what is good. I said above that this thesis can be viewed as a somewhat negative one – as noting that God does not, in a certain sense, cause evil. Yet it is also a pretty positive thesis. For it tells us that there are no created goods which are not God’s doing. And that thought allows us to wax positively eloquent when it comes to God’s goodness… It allows us to point to any create good and to say ‘God is at work there; he is making it to be’. And if God makes things to be by virtue of will (i.e. not because anything in or apart from himself is forcing him to do so), then created goods are nothing less than freely given gifts from God.”

Whether God Could Have Allowed Us To Be Doomed

In this post, I pointed out that on the classically theistic conception of God, God has no moral obligations. However, the worry, at least for some people, will be that this opens us up to a particularly strong notion of divine providence along the line of Calvinism. And indeed, theologians belonging to the Dominican Order, being indebted to Aquinas, have historically toted something like a Catholic version of Calvinism in debates about divine providence and grace. (See Garrigou-Lagrange’s treatment if you want to see what I am talking about.)

One question that arises is this: Given that God does not have any moral obligations, could God have simply allowed us to be eternally separated from him, and thus (by definition) in a state of hell? I am thinking this through lately, and I am not sure. So note that what I’m about to say is very promissory. With that said, here is my position: I’m inclined to say yes. Let me give some reasons why. I will not be basing my case in this post on what the Scriptures say, but only on what we know about God through reason. Ultimately I consider both the Scriptures and Christian Tradition–which Catholics take to be the two sources of divine revelation–to trump whatever I have to say here; hence, if there are decisive arguments either way from these sources I will go where they lead.

So let us consider the question. First, I do believe this: God has no moral obligation to save us, and is thus under no moral obligation to save us from hell. This, of course, follows immediately from the fact that God has no moral obligations. But this can be the case, and yet it not be possible for God to let us fall into oblivion. God cannot just do anything. He is still constrained by his very nature. God cannot, for instance, make it okay to kill innocent children. For God would be contradicting himself insofar as God has created human nature to be as it is, and thus what is good for human nature cannot change. So there are some things God cannot do, since they cannot be done, and thus the case is not absolutely settled.

Nevertheless, here are some reasons for thinking God did not have to save us and could have let us fall into hell. A first reason would be to consider God’s omnipotence. On the classical view, God can give existence to any consistent state of affairs; this is what omnipotence is. But the state of affairs where humans suffer eternal damnation and are not given a savior is a consistent state of affairs. Hence, God could have created it.

Second, in the classical theistic tradition God is taken to be immutable. But consider what it would mean to say that God could not have allowed us to fall into damnation. It would mean that, because of the evil actions of some free creatures, God was compelled to create something, such as the created nature of Jesus, in order to save us. But if God is immutable then he is intrinsically unchangeable, and thus no creature could have compelled him to create. Thus, God could never have been compelled to create a means of salvation, in which case God could have chosen not to give us a means of salvation. But if we had been given no means of salvation, then we would have been damned. Hence, God could have allowed us to be damned.

Once again, this is extremely promissory. I am willing to change my position if my arguments can be shown to have false premises. I will definitely change my position if it can be demonstrated that Scripture or Tradition contradict what I say.

Davies on God’s Obligations

Probably the central thesis of Brian Davies’s book The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil:

“To say that God is guilty by neglect is to say that there is something he ought to have done but has not — it is to hold him morally accountable. But it is a mistake to think of God as morally accountable. … To do so would involve thinking of God as a particular kind of thing subject to duties and obligations.”

I agree with what Davies says.  I think not viewing God as a person with moral obligations like us makes far more sense of Scripture and Christian Tradition. Also, in my opinion, it is central to resolving the problem of evil. Until about the 18th century nobody (by which I mean no serious theologian or philosopher) would have thought of God as a “person” at least in the  sense of being a moral agent like us. Thus, the problem of evil never really popped up, at least in the current form of trying to morally justify God’s actualizing this world. But insofar as atheists like Rowe or Schellenberg argue against a picture of God which takes him to be a perfectly morally good person I think they have a very compelling case, almost one so obvious it doesn’t need to be argued for. It is notable that, because of this, in the face of the failure of theodicies a lot of theists turn to the skeptical theistic response. These atheistic arguments would just be missing the point though if Davies is correct.

The motivation for not thinking of God as a moral agent would be a return to a more classical theistic conception of God as immutable, simple, timeless, cause of all existence other than himself.

A Moral Argument for Animalism

Yesterday I had the pleasure of attending this conference. I really enjoyed the opportunity to meet some great philosophers and engage in some substantive discussion.

One of my favorite presentations was the second one by Andrew Bailey.  He defended a position known as ‘animalism’, which is the thesis that we, as individuals, are a type of animal. It is a position I am quite sympathetic to over substance dualism.

He starts with a moral datum (MD): To harm a human organism is, in the ordinary case, to harm a human animal. Bailey clarified that by ‘harm’ he meant the deprivation of some good which is supposed to be there. Now, as we know from Bayesian reasoning, if some event/hypothesis E which is actually the case is more likely to happen given some event F than given ~F, then E is evidence for F over ~F. But, Bailey argues, MD is true, and MD is more likely to be true given animalism than given the negation of animalism. Hence, MD provides evidence for animalism.

It seems that MD is true. When you cause pain in the organism to which we all agree I am related, you cause me pain. When you shoot a human organism you (at least in some way) harm a person. Moreover, it seem MD  is more likely given animalism than its negation for the simple reason that, on this hypothesis, the human organism you harm is identical to a human person. There need be no complex system of relations in virtue of which MD comes out true. Hence, MD provides evidence that animalism is true.

While I am very sympathetic to this position, I think there are a few places the anti-animalist will want to push. But what are your thoughts?

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