“For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but it is God’s power to us who are being saved”. 1 Corinthians 1:18
Introduction
Throughout the centuries of our existence, we have experienced and committed countless atrocities that have brought about much suffering. There are times when the world looks as if evil has ruled over the innocent and brought favor to the wicked. They prosper as the righteous suffer. Evil becomes good and good becomes evil. These are perhaps the darkest moments of mankind and it is during these moments that we cry out for justice the most. Obviously, there’s something clearly wrong with the world as it is not what it ought to be. I think part of the problem is that we tend to only be genuinely concerned about this when some evil is done to us or those we care about. We may be sentimental toward those who suffer at the hands of evil but nothing is truly done to help them. Instead, we rely on others like the church or the government to take care of these things for us. We’ll look for someone to blame but we won’t look for a solution. And the solutions we look for often place too much hope in the goodness of men that it backfires into the exact evils we attempted to prevent (cf, liberalism, communism, socialism, etc).
Embracing Tension
Humanity has had centuries upon centuries to correct this problem. If we were inherently good, the problem of evil would have already been solved. Unfortunately, that’s not the case and our inability (and unwillingness) to correct this has rightly led some to seek salvation from a higher power. Skeptics often scoff at the experiential force of that need for God until it becomes convenient for them to use it as a tool against the existence of God. Our desire for justice in something greater than ourselves is like a double edged sword – it can provide us great hope but it can also be used to give us great contempt. There’s a real need for God at the metaphysical level (to ground moral values) and at the experiential level (to save us from corruption). To recognize God as the only possible solution can provide great hope but if we believe He has refused to actualize that solution, then we can just as easily be filled with great contempt.
I find this tension rather fascinating because it is this tension that is openly embraced by the Christian. We’re called to love at the cost of our lives and yet we also desire justice. How can this be? For the atheist, this is nothing but incoherent nonsense. I understand their complaint and would by no means suggest we should embrace blatant contradictions but because most atheists do not have objective moral values, there’s no tension within their worldview. Evil is just pitiless indifference, as Dawkins so eloquently put it. You may be inclined to think that the less tension a worldview has, the more true it probably is but it’s one thing to be intellectually consistent but another thing to be practically inconsistent with that worldview. Whenever atheists use the problem of evil, there tends to be some moral outrage toward our beliefs. If there are no objective values, where does that rage come from?
The Greatest Evil
Atheists avoid this objection by pointing to the fact that they’re assuming the Christian worldview to demonstrate its self-refuting nature. This is true, but it still fails to explain their moral outrage. For now we’ll ignore their inconsistency and focus on strengthening their argument. Huh? Why would I do that, you ask? Because I think doing so will demonstrate the weakness of their argument. Don’t worry, I’ll explain how that works. The problem of evil begins by noting evils like rape, torture, murder, slavery, human trafficking, etc as reasons why a good God cannot(or probably does not) exist. Human life, after all, has value, so if God is all good, all knowing, and all powerful, how could He let this happen to us? Notice who’s suffering is being emphasized here – us. God, on the other hand, is painted as a being outside of this suffering. If you’re going to assume the Christian worldview, however, that is absolutely wrong. Regardless of whether you regard this as true, the Bible claims God so loved the world that “He gave His One and Only Son” (John 3:16) to suffer and die for our sins.
If you just asked, “So what?” then I’m afraid that’s because you fail to recognize how great of an evil this is. Think of how much you value human life to the point that it is used to question the very existence of God. According to Aquinas, a cause cannot give what it does not have. Whatever value that you see in the effect must exist in some form in the cause. If this is the case, then all of the souls that could possibly exist cannot be greater than the infinite value that can be found in God Himself. You may not personally value God but that is to be expected (Romans 3:11). At this point, it does not matter how you feel about God as the argument stands on its own rational merit. Given this context, the crucifixion is given a much more substantial meaning. If the Father sent Christ to suffer and die at the cross for the sins of men then that is indeed the greatest possible evil. He experienced the greatest shame, the greatest suffering, and the greatest injustice that mankind could ever conceive. Let’s turn this into an argument that I call the greatest problem of evil:
1. If the Christian God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good.
2. If God were omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good then His Son would not suffer the greatest evil.
3. His Son suffered the greatest evil.
4. Therefore, it is not the case that the Christian God exists.
By greatness, I am only referring to the quality of the crime and not the quantity. Ask yourself this: Would you send your only beloved wife to die for a murderer? Of course not. How about a hundred murderers? Probably not. But this is precisely what the Father did to His own Son – whom He shared perfect unity, love, and being with. This love is so great that it can only be qualitatively but analogously compared to the love that a man has for a woman. Yet it pleased the Father to crush the Son severely (Isaiah 53:10) because of our iniquities. What kind of sick and twisted God is this? How could He send and allow His Son to die for those who deserve to be punished? The depth of this evil is quite frankly unfathomable. No sickness, no loneliness, no sadness, no famine, and no evil can compare to the abominable act that the Bible portrays this as. It’s easier to focus on those lesser evils but come on, this is where the greater evil is at! It is the irony of ironies that the foundation for Christianity would actually be the greatest reason for His non-existence.
Conclusion
Fortunately for us, I doubt skeptics will appeal to this argument because humans do not value God as much as they value themselves and each other. It’s much more emotionally compelling to assume God has not suffered anything of value while we blame Him for the evil that we see today. I do not think my argument succeeds but if that is the case then neither will the other evils that humans experience. It is by knowing that good came from the greatest evil that we know that good can come from every lesser evil. For what evil can befall a world that compares to what came upon the son of God? Your sickness, your pain, and your loneliness is like a bucket of water being thrown into an ocean of His tears. Yet it is for that bucket of water that Christ died for. If you would only trust Him, that bucket could be drowning in the ocean of His love. Don’t think that the Father is too far above to see that you are in need. He came down because He cares enough to be our Savior. You will suffer in this life as Christ did but it is His pain that will comfort you and it is His death that will give you life.
Christians, how would you respond to this argument?
Skeptics, would you use this argument? If not, why not?
10 Responses to The Greatest Problem of Evil
Robert April 18, 2012
I wouldn’t use this argument so much for its conclusion, but I would use it as a tool to make people think about how POE arguments in general work. It doesn’t seem very strong to me because it’s focusing specifically on one instance of evil; and we can’t really extrapolate other instances of evil from it.
This is in contrast to classic POE problems such as “Rowe’s fawn”. Talking about one instance of evil (a fawn suffering alone for several days before dying) makes us consider other instances of evil that are like this one in some way. It’s easy to answer the fawn instance itself – maybe there was a guy walking nearby who could have helped, but did nothing. But this does nothing to address the type of evil Rowe’s fawn is an example of – evil which at least appears pointless.
But the problem with the “greatest POE” argument is that there’s only one instance of the type “greatest evil”. Once this one instance is accounted for, there are no more similar instances to account for, and the argument is done for. The only type of theism this argument would be strong against would be one in which there are many gods who often sacrifice themselves or their family members in various ways and to varying degrees.
Also, 3 seems pretty weak at best, and begging the question at worst. The so-called “greatest evil”, according to Christianity, resulted in the greatest good – so the argument can’t really be used as an internal critique. And if you assume that the good results (salvation, etc.) didn’t happen in response to 3, you’re also assuming that Christianity is false. Still, it’s always a good idea to examine novel arguments like these, even if it’s only for practice.
Gil Sanders April 18, 2012
Robert,
I wouldn’t use this argument so much for its conclusion, but I would use it as a tool to make people think about how POE arguments in general work. It doesn’t seem very strong to me because it’s focusing specifically on one instance of evil; and we can’t really extrapolate other instances of evil from it.
Right, I think so too. I would beg to differ on its strength, though. The quantity of instances do not determine the quality of an evil. Like I argued in the post, this is an evil against an infinitely perfect God. No multiplicity of evils in this world could compare to that. Extrapolating other instances is difficult with any form of evil. The fawn, for example, may have other instances if we replace it with a koala but the principle is ultimately the same.
But this does nothing to address the type of evil Rowe’s fawn is an example of – evil which at least appears pointless.
The problem with this evil is that it’s not a moral evil. The more appropriate term would be natural evil. It may appear pointless but that’s not particularly significant because such natural evils could be the product of a greater context. For example, it may appear that one block of legos is pointless but if we consider it from a holistic perspective, we see that it is required for a certain structure. God’s goodness is hardly challenged in this case.
But the problem with the “greatest POE” argument is that there’s only one instance of the type “greatest evil”. Once this one instance is accounted for, there are no more similar instances to account for, and the argument is done for.
I do not see that as a problem. Every other instance is still an “evil” but they’d only be analogous to the greatest evil. On the other hand, you’re correct in saying that any explanation for the greatest evil would not necessarily be sufficient to explain every kind of evil. Each would require different variations or explanations that pertain to that specific evil. Nonetheless, what this does is establish that even the greatest evils can have greater goods. If the greatest evil can be accounted for, then it is highly probable that other evils can be accounted for as well.
And if you assume that the good results (salvation, etc.) didn’t happen in response to 3, you’re also assuming that Christianity is false. Still, it’s always a good idea to examine novel arguments like these, even if it’s only for practice.
Exactly! You summed my responses quite well. I appreciate your feedback, as always
You’re always welcome to comment here.
Robert April 18, 2012
Like I argued in the post, this is an evil against an infinitely perfect God.
That brings up an interesting thought – this is true, but God is also somewhat of a perpetrator here. Given the trinity, the closest human analogy I can think of is probably doctor-assisted euthanasia (with the Romans being the doctor), but that doesn’t seem exactly right.
As for the fawn, we don’t have to replace it with another animal to get a new instance. We could put it into a different situation. For example, imagine it’s infested with parasites that cause it severe gastrointestional distress. One might be tempted to argue that there’s good-making properties here for the parasites, but if I were to breed similar parasites that infect humans, we presumably wouldn’t say this. The idea of parasites could then lead us to consider invasive species.
Natural evils *could* be the product of a greater context, but we could think of some examples that don’t appear to be. We could also argue that these greater contexts aren’t necessary, and things as a whole could be different in such a way that everything else is roughly the same, but without the natural evil.
Finally, I don’t think it follows from the fact that the greatest evil can be accounted for that all lesser evils probably can be as well. Especially if the way we account for the greatest evil is to say that it leads to even greater goods – imagine a case where a man with no family or friends kidnaps a woman in the same situation and brings her deep into the woods. He then kills her, but the house catches on fire and he dies as well. Then, a nearby river floods, carrying the rubble into the ocean. We don’t find any evidence of this until many years later. I can’t think of any good that can come of such an event; not even the type that motivates us to prevent such things from happening again in the future. Considering that there are other evils which do a lot to motivate us to prevent additional evils from taking place, discovery of this instance long after it happened probably wouldn’t motivate us any further.
Exactly! You summed my responses quite well. I appreciate your feedback, as always
You’re always welcome to comment here.
Word, yo.
Robert April 18, 2012
Feel free to delete this post after a few minutes. I’m just testing the new bible verse feature to see how it works.
Ecclesiastes 4:13
Ecclesiastes 4:13 ESV
(Ecclesiastes 4:13)
(Ecclesiastes 4:13 NIV)
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ecclesiastes%204:13&version=ESV
(http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ecclesiastes%204:13&version=ESV)
Robert April 18, 2012
Tobit 1:1
Robert April 18, 2012
No love for the orthodox denominations I see
Gil Sanders April 19, 2012
That brings up an interesting thought – this is true, but God is also somewhat of a perpetrator here.
True, I think he put the circumstances into place but only through the free choice of evil men. Your analogy is interesting but like you said, is lacking.
As for the fawn, we don’t have to replace it with another animal to get a new instance. We could put it into a different situation. For example, imagine it’s infested with parasites that cause it severe gastrointestional distress.
Ultimately, it’s the same kind of natural evil – namely animal suffering. It may be taken more seriously if it infects humans, for sure, but this is not a new instance. I could, for example, imagine a scenario where Christ suffered in a different manner and died but the kind of evil that He endured is largely the same.
Natural evils *could* be the product of a greater context, but we could think of some examples that don’t appear to be.
Again, perceptions of this nature are deceiving. First off, the suffering of an animal is not nearly as significant as a human that possesses consciousness. It only has what you’d call second-degree pain but since there is no awareness, it is hardly an evil that needs to be taken as a serious threat to Christianity. Second, evils at certain locations may appear pointless but it may be the accidental product of a system that is itself necessary – but nevertheless allows for the potential for such events to occur. This seems like a rather likely explanation, given what we know about the universe.
Finally, I don’t think it follows from the fact that the greatest evil can be accounted for that all lesser evils probably can be as well. Especially if the way we account for the greatest evil is to say that it leads to even greater goods
I think all accounts reduce to a greater good. If the greatest evil can be accounted for then any other evil must itself be capable of being explained – either through a more fundamental good (e.g, free will) or a greater good (e.g, salvation). Every evil that could ever exist must all be subsumed by this great evil. If that is the case, then the fact that the resurrection occurred is enough to provide epistemic justification for believing that lesser evils can be accounted for by that same divine wisdom, power, and love. Skeptical theism, if properly guided by this event, would be justified. Furthermore, I’d appeal to the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of God that demonstrates His necessary goodness alongside His necessary existence. If all of this is the case, then we truly have a much greater reason for there being an explanation for these evils and a great defeater for an appealingly gratuitous evils.
Robert April 19, 2012
I could, for example, imagine a scenario where Christ suffered in a different manner and died but the kind of evil that He endured is largely the same.
Ok, you’ve got a point here. But anyway, I’m inclined to reject 3 based on what we’ve talked about, that this so-called greatest evil actually had great goods associated with it. But, I’m not merely saying that these goods justify the greatest evil – I’m saying that because of these goods, it’s not the greatest evil at all. I’m baffled as to what could take its place, though.
First off, the suffering of an animal is not nearly as significant as a human that possesses consciousness. It only has what you’d call second-degree pain but since there is no awareness, it is hardly an evil that needs to be taken as a serious threat to Christianity.
There’s a point to make here about animal consciousness and speciesism. Some animals, such as chimps and dolphins, do seem to have some degree of consciousness. It’s not as much as ours, so the suffering of one human is still worse than the suffering of one animal, but it gets a lot more fuzzy when you compare one human to many animals. Would you wipe out all dolphins to save one human? I’m not so sure I would.
There’s also an additional point about ecosystems. Would you wipe out all bees to save one human? I most certainly would *not* – because the effects of doing so would cause many humans to die of starvation or malnutrition (bees pollinate plants, some of these plants are our food).
If the greatest evil can be accounted for then any other evil must itself be capable of being explained – either through a more fundamental good (e.g, free will) or a greater good (e.g, salvation).
Here’s a brief preview of an article I’m writing:
- Natural evils are physically necessary, but not logically necessary.
- The goods that possibly obtain because of some natural evils could also obtain without these evils.
- God has the power to create a universe in which these natural evils do not obtain and in which there are human-like beings that are situated morally similarly.
- Thus, these evils are unnecessary and unjustified.
Gil Sanders April 20, 2012
But, I’m not merely saying that these goods justify the greatest evil – I’m saying that because of these goods, it’s not the greatest evil at all.
The quality of an evil is always judged by the quality of the good. The more valuable something is, the worse that evil is. Just because moral evils have a greater good does not itself lessen the degree of that evil. If that was the case, your position would require us to think that some moral evils are lesser than natural evils simply because a moral evil has a greater good. That wouldn’t follow. I am bewildered that you’d claim it is not the greatest evil when you remain baffled as to what could replace it.
The answer is: nothing can replace the greatest possible being.
Some animals, such as chimps and dolphins, do seem to have some degree of consciousness.
That’s true, they do possess a higher form of consciousness in comparison to other animals. However, intellect and volition is required for self-reflection and self-determination. Not just intellect in the computational sense, but in the degree that it is capable of understanding nature in an abstract manner. These operations require an immaterial substance and therefore cannot be actualized in any fully natural being. That is, if you assume the view that I am advocating here.
Here’s a brief preview of an article I’m writing:
Looks interesting, I’ll be sure to read it
I’d disagree, however, as I think it is metaphysically necessary of physical beings that it undergo some kind of destructive force to sustain the kind of existence that it has now. I could be wrong, though. Natural evils are not exactly my forte, but I’d be willing to think deeper about it.
Robert April 20, 2012
I just posted my article, here it is: http://dubitodeus.wordpress.com/2012/04/20/another-world-an-argument-from-natural-evil/