Monthly Archives: March 2012

Etienne Gilson on God

 

“What God is in His eternal self, He remains as cause of events. Creatures passing through time have given Him various names. But each name marks a relationship between creatures and Him, not between Him and creatures. Man emerges from nothingness–and calls God his creator. Man recognizes this creator as his supreme master–and calls him Lord. Man sins, is lost, is saved by the Word made Flesh–and he calls God his Redeemer. This long history is developed in time and in a changing world, but God is no more changed by it than a column which moves from right to left as we pass to and fro before it. God is Creator for those whom He creates and whom His eternal efficacy redeems each moment from nothingness. He is Savior of those whom He saves and Lord for those who profess to serve Him. But in Him creation and redemption are but His action which, like His power, is one with His act-of-being. In order that the first principle of philosophy rejoin in this way the God of religion, and in order that the same God of religion be Author of Nature and God of history at the same time, it has been necessary to follow the meaning of the name of God in its profoundest existential implication. I Am is the only God of whom it can be said that He is God of philosophers, and scholars, and God, too, of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob.” (142-143)

-Etienne Gilson in The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas

The Top 7 Things I Want For This Nation

  1. I want to force my morality on everyone else.
  2. I want there to be a theocracy where Christianity rains supreme and suppresses atheists.
  3. I want every female to wear a burka and do everything their husbands say, even if what their husbands say is wrong and immoral.
  4. I want homosexuals to be shipped off to San Francisco.
  5. I want Young Earth Creationism to dominate the schools and be the paradigm scientific theory.
  6. I want there the gun laws to be lowered to allow 16 year olds to carry a concealed weapon in every state.
  7. I want to ban everyone from having any sex at all.

If you have anything more to add to this list, just post it below ;) Also, check out this view if you don’t get where I’m coming from ;)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-_JhRJ0tWA

Scott Klusendorf Quotes

Here is a set of quotes of Scott Klusendorf. Enjoy!

“Religion and politics: Do you mean the federal government should not establish a state church (denomination) or do you mean that believers have no right to bring their values to the public square and argue for them, like everyone else does? If the former, I agree. If the latter, what’s your constitutional support for such a claim?”

“It is no more a religious claim to say an embryo has value than it is to claim a Black Man does. Suppose that instead of killing embryos for research, someone were to suggest killing ethnic minorities for that same purpose. Would anyone dare to suggest that those opposing the ethnic killings were simply forcing their religious views on the rest of us? Truth be told, the “religious” objection is a cop-out, a means of avoiding the question of whether all human beings–regardless of race, gender, level of development, and location–have an equal right to life.”

“What “pro-choice” now means: 1) You do not have the right to choose whether or not to purchase health insurance that provides for abortion, even if doing so deeply violates your conscience. 2) You do not have the right to choose whether or not your 12 year old daughter gets an abortion without your knowledge or consent. 3) If you are a religious organization, you do not have the right to choose to not to provide abortion coverage from your employees. 4) If you are a medical school, you do not have the right to choose whether or not to provide abortion training. In short, you will obey or we will bring the full force of law to bear on you.”

“For Thomson’s argument to work, the relationship between the mother and the intruder must parallel the mother’s relationship to her own child. Right away there are problems. First, there can be no intruder until two parents create him. Second, abortion is much more than withholding support—it’s actively killing another human through dismemberment or poisoning. Indeed, per Thomson, I not only have the right to remove an innocent intruder from my yard; I can cut him up and throw his body parts in the garbage! As abortion-choice advocate and philosopher Mary Anne Warren points out, “mere ownership does not give me the right to kill innocent people whom I find on my property.”

Dangerous – KJ-52

Every now and then, I’ll listen to a song like this because it so powerfully describes me. That probably sounds cliche, but oh well, I don’t know of a better way to explain this. I am a wretched sinner and while I can forgive others, I cannot “forgive or forget” what I have done because I fail to trust in Christ’s forgiveness. Instead, I’ll hold onto them and let myself fall victim to self-resentment and regret. For so long, that sadness has been my place of solitude and I do so well to hide it from others. Who would’ve known God would drag me out of that place and place me into a heart that would forever change me. At the same time, it’s just a bit scary to think about losing my way and going back to the things I hate. I still struggle like anyone else but at least I can depend on Him to help me through it.

Warning: If you hate any hint of rap, don’t listen to this. It’s just a good song that I found for self-reflection.

Classical Theism vs. Neo-Theism I: Divine Simplicity

In contemporary debates about the existence of God it is common to hear reference to ‘the traditional divine attributes.’ These include properties like omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, immateriality, eternality, and personality. It is supposed that if God exists he ‘exemplifies all of these great-making properties’. This is the ‘orthodox’ conception of God in contemporary philosophy of religion and philosophical theology as heard from Craig, Plantinga, Swinburne, and most others.

Unfortunately, right from the get-go, there is a perfectly good sense in which this conception of God is unorthodox. According to the Fourth Lateran and First Vatican Councils of the Catholic Church, the doctrine that God is a perfectly simple being–one without any composition–is defined as infallible, binding dogma, denial of which amounts to heresy. Hence, the doctrine has some degree of pedigree in that it has been held by billions of Christians to be a very important doctrine. But even aside from this I would argue that the contemporary view–what I will call ‘neo-theism’–is directly contrary to the truly ’classical theistic’ view of God’s nature. Classical theism has been the majority opinion for thousands of years. It is the view of the great pagan philosophers like Aristotle and Plotinus, the Christian Saints Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Bl. Duns Scotus, as well as other monotheistic thinkers like Maimonides, Averroes, and Avicenna. Such classical theists would deny that God is ‘personal’ or ‘perfectly good’ or ‘eternal’ in the sense that neo-theists take God to be. Distinctively classical theistic doctrines which are unpopular among the neo-theists of today include divine immutability, timelessness, and simplicity. I will focus on this last doctrine as an example of a fundamental difference between the two views, and argue that the classical theist view maintains God’s perfection in a way which the neo-theist view does not.

The way that God’s attributes are defined in contemporary philosophy of religion as above implicitly contradicts divine simplicity from the start. According to the contemporary view, when we predicate perfect moral goodness of God as in the sentence ‘God is good’, the referent of the term ‘God’s goodness’ is the property of goodness. Likewise, if we say ‘God is omniscient’, the referent of the term ‘God’s omniscience’ is the property of omniscience, and similarly for omnipotence, immateriality, and so on. However divine simplicity says that the referents of all intrinsic predications about God are identical, for to say otherwise would be to introduce metaphysical complexity into God. Hence, it is common to hear classical theists saying that God’s goodness IS his omniscience, which IS his omnipotence, and so on. But it would seem to follow that omnipotence and goodness are the same property, which is clearly false; indeed, it would follow that God is himself a property!

Obviously the classical theist doesn’t want to commit himself to such seemingly absurd claims, and it would be stupid to suppose 2,000 years of great thinkers were simply willing to accept a manifest falsehood. The more reasonable inference is that contemporary and classical thinkers are working with very different metaphysical presuppositions, and this is correct.

One neo-theist assumption is the Platonist, relational ontology within which Plantinga phrases the objection presented above. For Plantinga and other contemporary detractors reality consists of concrete individuals, platonic properties, and relations of exemplification. The platonic properties are abstract objects, which means they lack efficient causal power, while the causally efficacious concrete individuals exemplify these properties. Clearly God is an individual, since as creator of the universe he possesses causal power, in which case it follows he could not be an abstract object; hence he could not be identical to any of his properties, and thus divine simplicity is false. But certainly none of the classical presenters of simplicity accepted this ontological framework. Rather, following Aristotle, they would take a thing’s features to be ontological constituents of a subject. This is the picture found in Aristotle’s Categories for instance, where accidents such as color or size are said to be ‘present in’ a subject. Among contemporary philosophers D.M. Armstrong’s theory of universals seems to be an example of a constituent ontology as well. Within such a framework it’s not obviously incoherent to suppose that God is identical with his constituents so long as we can admit the idea of an improper constituent (analogous to an improper part or improper subset), since it doesn’t follow from the very meaning of the term ‘ontological constituent’ that the constituent in question is a property; ‘ontological constituent’ is a category-neutral term, and doesn’t necessarily imply Plantinga’s relational ontology.

More generally though we can make sense of divine simplicity in terms of truthmakers. The neo-theist assumes that the referents of abstract singular terms like ‘Alfredo’s audacity’, or in our case ‘God’s goodness’, are platonic properties. This is what makes it impossible for God’s to be identical with his goodness, for this to be identical to his omniscience, and so on. However, those who embrace divine simplicity can deny this account of predication. Rather, a classical theist will accept a truthmaker account, where an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for “a is F” and state that God is identical with the truthmakers for each of his predications. This makes sense because a truthmaker is an entity in the world in virtue of which a proposition is true. Clearly by this understanding truthmakers need not be properties (they can sometimes be). They can also be substances, as is the case with God–to deny this would at least have to be argued for and such a denial is on the face of it implausible. Hence, it is perfectly coherent to say God is his omniscience, which is his omnipotence, and so on. All this is saying is that God is identical to that in virtue of which he is omnipotent, that he is identical to that in virtue of which he is omniscient, and so on; and moreover, by the transitivity of identity, these things are each identical to each other. This picture shows that divine simplicity is not obviously contradictory and deserves much more than the charges of ‘unintelligibility’ and ‘incoherence’ ignorantly thrown at it today.

With these charges of absurdity put to one side we can see that divine simplicity is at least prima facie coherent. Certainly we will need to be given better arguments than Plantinga’s cavalier dismissal of 2000 years of philosophy based on the presupposition of his own anachronistic ontology. But to argue something is logically coherent isn’t to argue that it’s true. In another post I will provide an argument to the effect that only a  simple God can truly be said to exist of himself and thus be perfect.

Lawrence Krauss, to put it bluntly, is a dolt.

In this article, philosopher David Albert, who is professor of philosophy at at Columbia, slaps Krauss’s hands for being a bad, bad boy. He essentially condemns Krauss’s thesis in his new book A UNIVERSE FROM NOTHING: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing.

Excerpt:

Krauss, mind you, has heard this kind of talk before, and it makes him crazy. A century ago, it seems to him, nobody would have made so much as a peep about referring to a stretch of space without any material particles in it as “nothing.” And now that he and his colleagues think they have a way of showing how everything there is could imaginably have emerged from a stretch of space like that, the nut cases are moving the goal posts. He complains that “some philosophers and many theologians define and redefine ‘nothing’ as not being any of the versions of nothing that scientists currently describe,” and that “now, I am told by religious critics that I cannot refer to empty space as ‘nothing,’ but rather as a ‘quantum vacuum,’ to distinguish it from the philosopher’s or theologian’s idealized ‘nothing,’ ” and he does a good deal of railing about “the intellectual bankruptcy of much of theology and some of modern philosophy.” But all there is to say about this, as far as I can see, is that Krauss is dead wrong and his religious and philosophical critics are absolutely right.

I’ve posted a couple times about Krauss and his new book about  ”nothing.” I wonder if anyone can get through to this fool. Krauss, to put it bluntly, is a dolt. He needs to keep doing what he’s good at–namely, science, and please step away from philosophy and theology, because he clearly has no idea what he’s talking about.

Chivalry

Chivalry: the medieval knightly system with its religious, moral, and social code.

Being honored by a virtuous woman for your godliness, righteousness, and servitude is more valuable than the world itself.   Today, however, males are valued for how attractive and physically strong they are. Instead of being men, they’re reduced to nothing but self-centered pigs. Females who seek after such “boys” are just as shallow. A true woman will only seek a man who she can highly honor as her own knight. A true man will honor and serve the woman that he loves. As this picture so beautifully demonstrates, the male has humbly bowed his knee to receive the honor that she has bestowed upon him. He’s not flexing his muscles, he’s submitting to her. If I found a wife that valued such things, I’d willingly bow my knee and die for her.

Silly thought: I wonder what it would be like to reenact that picture XD

Opinion, Neutrality, and Moral Relativism: Getting Past the Rhetoric and Nonsense

This post is birthed out of observations I’ve made about our culture and from some of the conversations I’ve had with friends and other philosophers. I first want to offer a commentary and argument against this wave of “it’s your opinion” statements. More specifically, I’m going to do a brief lesson on what an argument is and what an opinion is. Secondly, this will immediately bring me to a conversation about neutrality with regards to moral judgements and how the government is an example of something that is not neutral. More specifically, people try to say “don’t impose your beliefs on me through the government,” as if the government was some sort of neutral place; news flash, there’s no such thing as a neutral government. Lastly, this will lead me to a face-to-face encounter with moral relativism. So, here we go:

One of the things I’m just fascinated by is how people in general couch their views or arguments in terms of “opinion” so as to maintain a type of neutrality. Whether they intentionally do this or not is beyond me, but that’s besides the point. First, what exactly is an opinion? If you’ve taken an introduction to logic course, you will learn the difference between a fact and opinion and what they actually are. In learning what the components of an argument are, you are able to catch when someone is making an argument or merely expressing an opinion. So let us explore what an argument is and then we will turn to what an opinion is.

What is an argument?

Patrick Hurley, in his A Concise Introduction to Logic, explains that “a passage contains an argument if it purports to prove something [...] two conditions must be fulfilled for a passage to purport to prove something:

  1. At least one of the statements must claim to present evidence or reasons.
  2. There must be a claim that the alleged evidence supports or implies something–that is, a claim that something follows from the alleged evidence or reasons” (14).
The second condition is known as an inferential claim. Basically, an inferential claim is something that demonstrates some sort of reasoning process. For instance:
All Cats are furry.
Bob is a Cat
Thus, Bob is furry
In taking a look at this simple argument, you can see that there is a reasoning process going on. Based on the first two premises, which serves as evidence or reasons, I derive a conclusion. I am making an inferential claim, and thus I have an argument (I just did the same thing here. Did you catch that? ;) )
Now, Hurley turns to explaining some simple non inferential passages or claims, that is, claims that do not have a claim that is meant to be proved. Some examples of non inferential claims are:
  1. warnings
  2. pieces of advice
  3. a belief or opinion
  4. a report

There is one thing that Hurley stresses in each of these inferential claims: “If no evidence is given to prove that such statements are true, or if there is no evidence that is intended to prove anything, then there is no argument” (16-17). Let us focus on number 3.

Hurley defines a statement of belief or opinion as “an expression about what someone happens to believe or think about something” (17). The Oxford dictionary defines an opinion as “a view or judgment formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge.” The Oxford definition does explain what an opinion is, but i don’t think it will work when we get down to the nitty gritty of logic. The Oxford definition says that it’s a view or judgment formed that is not necessarily based on fact or knowledge. So, in other words, it can be based on fact or knowledge and still be an opinion. But this is still extremely vague. I can make judgements that are based on fact or knowledge and these “judgements” are true, but will be passed off as just an opinion, although I may have reasons for that judgement. So, this definition won’t entirely work. We need something more. Hurley, however, adds that something more by adding, “[if one doesn't make] any claim that his or her belief or opinion is supported by evidence, or that it supports some conclusion, there is no argument” (17). If I make a mere statement of belief, with no evidence or reasons, then yes, I am merely stating an opinion. However, if I make a claim to something true, and if I list a reason for it (even if the reasons are extremely stupid; there still needs to be at least some reason) and make an inferential claim, it has left the opinion building and entered the argument building.

So, when I make a claim, say to a moral objective standard and I give reasons, I am not merely stating some opinion. I am making an argument. Whether there are moral facts or not is another question, which is one I might  briefly jump into later. To briefly hit on the question of what truth is, I’ll appeal to philosopher Ric Machuga since he can explain it simply: “Realists like Aristotle and Aquinas defines ‘truth’ as the correspondence of what we say or think with what really exists” (84). I could say much more about this, however, I’ll save that for another post.

Neutrality

I always hear the objection that Christians (and other religious people) should keep their religious views to themselves and not bring them into politics. We shouldn’t force our moral views on others by making the government endorse them. Even if we’re not making the government endorse them, we shouldn’t force our views on other people simply because everyone is entitled to their own belief or “opinion” (there we go we opinion and belief again). If we do so, since our views stem from a religion, thus the government must be supporting a religious view and thus it violates the separation of church and state. Moreover, If I’m making a moral objective claim about something, say that abortion is wrong, I cannot impose my belief or “opinion” on others.

First, I would agree that everyone is entitled to their opinion or belief. There’s no problem there. But I think if someone is wrong, and if we have good reasons to think so, there’s nothing wrong with challenging those beliefs or opinions. Secondly, there are a lot of assumptions with those statements made in the above paragraph. What is the relationship between religion and morality? And what is the relationship between government and morality? The middle term here that connect religion and government is morality. Moreover, the other assumption is that the government must be neutral with regards to religious matters. But what does it mean to be neutral, and can the government be neutral? Sorry to spoil the fun boys and girls, but one way or the other, the government is going to fall on one side of the debate. That is inevitable.

Either it sides with the religious man that has his moral view or it sides with the secularist or liberal who has her moral view. It’s either going to side with the pro-choice woman that says “Abortion is not wrong; refusing my choice to abort is wrong” or it sides with the conservative pro-lifer who says, “Abortion is wrong.” The pro-choicer will “force” her views down the throat of others, and the same will happen with the other person. Even by saying that you’re not trying to force your view on someone, simply by taking a stand for your view, and or endorsing policies that supports your view, you are essentially “forcing” your view on others or making particular judgements on people–namely, that one ought not refuse the “right” for someone to abort. So, inevitably someone’s morality is being forced upon the other. Doesn’t this undercut the whole complaint that we “shouldn’t force our moral views on others”?

Because moral relativism is such a big topic, I’ve decided to break up this post into two parts. So, I’ll deal with moral relativism in part 2 of this post.


The First Principles of Faith, Family, and Freedom

This is an excerpt from Jay W. Richards and James Robinson’s book Indivisible: Restoring Faith, Family, and Freedom Before It’s Too Late:

  1. Every human being has equal value and dignity.
  2. We are inherently and specifically social.
  3. Marriage and the family are the fundamental social institutions.
  4. We can know God and moral truth.
  5. Judaeo-Christian religious faith guards our freedom.
  6. We’re all sinners.
  7. We need a state strong enough to protect and maintain the rule of law but limited enough not to violate it.
  8. We are meant to be free and responsible.
  9. When we’re free, we can create wealth.
  10. Culture comes before politics

(pg. 310)

This book was excellent. I can’t recommend it enough.

Edward Feser on Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Private Property

I was going to do a blog post on the topic of natural law and natural rights, but Edward Feser was ahead of me and did a much better job than anything I could produce. Check out his post here. Also, sorry for not posting as much lately. I noticed WC has been a bit slower than usual lately. I’m working on a post where I share some thoughts on something from Aquinas’s Treatise on Law. Stay tuned ;)

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